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The broad theme of this article is social justice in the context of 
commercial medical research that uses human biological material, 
such as blood samples or other tissue samples that may have been 
removed during a medical procedure on a patient. Within this 
broad theme, the following question is germane: Is it fair that the 
researchers and the investors in the research can commercially 
gain from the research, while the research participants – persons 
who participate in such medical research by, among others, making 
available biological material from their bodies – are expected to do 
so altruistically? 
Current healthcare public policy answers this question in the 
affirmative: In March 2012, the South African (SA) Minister of 
Health made the Regulations Relating to the Use of Human Biological 
Material[1] in terms of the National Health Act.[2] These Regulations 
deal with the use of human biological material for research purposes, 
and provide that a person from whose body human biological material 
is withdrawn for research purposes may only be reimbursed for 
reasonable expenses incurred by him or her.[1,reg11] Accordingly, our law 
as it currently stands upholds an altruistic paradigm for participation 
in research and effectively outlaws any form of remuneration of the 
research participant over and above reimbursement for reasonable 
expenses. 
In a recent article, Mahomed et al.[3] explore the subject of commercial 
medical research that uses human biological material, and take an 
opposing position to the current healthcare public policy of altruism, 
suggesting that research participants should be entitled to share in the 
profits emanating from the research to which they contributed. As a 
vehicle for such entitlement, Mahomed et al. propose that research 
participants should have a statutory right regarding the information 
generated from research to which they contributed; therefore, in effect 
a new type of intellectual property right. 
In an open society, which SA aspires to be, no aspect of public policy 
should be sacrosanct and beyond critical, rational analysis. As such, the 
challenge to the current altruistic paradigm by Mahomed et al. should 
be welcomed. Moreover, I suggest that the issue of social justice in the 
context of commercial medical research that uses human biological 
material is an important legal-ethical issue in contemporary society, 
and deserves more critical analysis. To stimulate academic dis course 
on this issue, this article briefly responds to the article by Mahomed 
et al. This article is not intended to provide arguments for or against 
current healthcare public policy, but is intended to highlight the weak-
nesses in the challenge to current healthcare public policy mounted 
by Mahomed et al. In particular, I contend that the position regarding 
(non-)ownership of human biological material is not as vague as sug-
gested by Mahomed et al., but is in fact well established. I subsequently 
highlight that the only purported support that Mahomed et al. proffer 
for their proposed shift away from altruism in fact lends no support 
to such proposed shift. Lastly, accepting for the sake of argument that 
healthcare public policy may move away from altruism, I point out that 
profit-sharing as proposed by Mahomed et al. is not the only alternative 
to altruism, and suggest that other forms of community-based benefit-
sharing may be more appropriate alternatives. 
A note on terminology
Mahomed et al. employ the terms ‘human tissue’ and ‘tissue donors’. 
Instead of these terms, I use ‘human biological material’ and ‘research 
participant’. My reasons are as follows: 
The Regulations Relating to the Use of Human Biological Mater ial[1, reg1] 
define ‘biological material’ as: 
‘material from a human being including DNA, RNA, blastomeres, 
polar bodies, cultured cells, embryos, gametes, progenitor stem 
cells, small tissue biopsies and growth factors from the same.’
I suggest that ‘human biological material’ is therefore a more suitable 
term than ‘human tissue’ in the context of research using human 
biological material. 
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The Regulations Relating to the Use of Human Biological Material[1] 
employ the term ‘donor’. However, given that ‘donor’ has a legal-
technical meaning that implies ownership, I suggest that this term 
may as such cause confusion. I rather employ the term ‘research 
participant’. The term ‘research participant’ is defined by the 
Department of Health[4,p59] as follows:
‘A living individual (or group of living individuals) about whom a 
researcher conducting research obtains data through intervention 
or interaction with the person or identifiable private information.’ 
The term is sufficiently wide to include – and therefore acknowl-
edge – activities by the research participant that go beyond allowing 
biological material to be withdrawn from her or his body, such as 
regularly completing questionnaires for the research, participating in 
the planning and conducting of the research project, and involvement 
in patient advocacy groups that may play an oversight role regarding 
the research. 
The issue of ownership of human 
biological material
Mahomed et al. suggest that there are no firm ‘rules’ regarding 
ownership of human biological material and, with reference to 
two landmark US cases, suggest that each situation will have to 
be determined on its own facts.[3,p18] It is against this background 
of purported legal uncertainty that Mahomed et al. propose the 
legislative intervention to create legal certainty in the form of a 
new statutory intellectual property right to ensure profit-sharing by 
research participants. 
However, I differ from the position of Mahomed et al. that there 
are no firm ‘rules’ regarding ownership of human biological material 
for three reasons: 
Firstly, the common law position in SA is clear, namely that 
the human body is not a proper object of ownership: Grotius,[5] a 
leading Roman-Dutch law authority, defines property as all useful 
things excluding or external to humans (my translation of: ‘Zaken 
noemen wy hier al wat daer is buiten den mensch, den mensch 
eenichsints nut zijnde.’); this definition by Grotius must be read with 
the provision in the Corpus Iuris Civilis[6] (a codification of Roman 
Law) that no-one is to be regarded as the owner of his own limbs 
(my translation of: ‘quoniam dominus membrorum suorum nemo 
videtur’). As Mahomed et al. point out, this general common law rule 
has been changed through secondary legislation – the Regulations 
Relating to Artificial Fertilisation of Persons[7] – in the specific case 
of gametes and embryos in the context of artificial reproduction. 
However, this exception created by these Regulations is specific to 
gametes and embryos in the context of artificial reproduction, and 
does not amount to general uncertainty regarding ownership of 
human biological material that calls for a case-by-case approach. In 
the absence of more legislation in this field, the courts will apply the 
rule that human biological material (except gametes and embryos in 
the context of artificial reproduction) cannot be owned. 
Secondly, US case law must be contextualised and cannot simply be 
applied to the SA context. For instance, one of the US cases discussed 
by Mahomed et al., Washington University v Catalona,[8] was decided in 
the jurisdiction of the state of Missouri, where – in contradistinction 
from SA – human biological material is a proper object of ownership. 
In other words, in Missouri ownership of human biological material 
can contractually be transferred from a research participant as original 
owner to another person, such as a research institution, that will then 
become the new legal owner. Such a transaction would be a legal 
impossibility in SA (arguably with the possible exception of gametes 
and embryos in the context of artificial reproduction). 
Thirdly, I do not agree with the interpretation by Mahomed et al. of 
the other landmark US case that they discuss in their article, Moore 
v Regents of the University of California.[9] In particular, Mahomed et 
al. state that the California Supreme Court found that ‘an individual 
has a tangible property right in his or her own tissue.’[3,p18] This is 
incorrect. In Moore v Regents of the University of California, the 
research participant indeed argued that withdrawn human biological 
material should be legally perceived as a species of tangible personal 
property, but although a lower court accepted this argument, the 
majority of the California Supreme Court held the argument to be 
‘problematic’.[9] The majority ruled that withdrawn human biological 
material is a legal object sui generis and that it cannot be assumed that 
the residual right to control the use of withdrawn human biological 
material amounts to ‘property’.[9] The statement by Mahomed et al. 
on this core issue is therefore the exact opposite of what was in fact 
decided by the California Supreme Court. 
Accordingly, the position taken by Mahomed et al. that there are no 
firm ‘rules’ regarding ownership of human biological material in SA, 
and that each situation will have to be determined on its own facts, 
does not hold water. As I state above, the SA common law position 
is clear, and approximates to the position set out by the California 
Supreme Court in Moore v Regents of the University of California. 
Profit-sharing by research participants
Mahomed et al. propose that the current altruistic paradigm be 
replaced by profit-sharing by research participants.[3,p19] The only 
purported support that Mahomed et al. proffer for such a major 
shift in healthcare public policy is a single article by Truog et al.[10] 
However, contrary to the statements by Mahomed et al. that they 
attribute to Truog et al., Truog et al. do not propose profit-sharing. In 
fact, Truog et al. conclude their article as follows:
‘While the intuition that tissue donors should be financially 
compensated for their donation is commendable, as a policy 
matter this approach is ethically and practically problematic. 
Except in those situations where the tissue’s market value can 
be estimated beforehand, investigators should adopt a practice of 
accepting tissue donations only when patients have freely agreed 
to give the donation as a gift, without expectation of monetary 
compensation. However, the altruism of patients to donate tissue 
to medical research must be met by similar generosity on the 
part of investigators and institutions. This could be accomplished 
through legislative mandates that promote the sharing of research 
findings and products with other scientists, or by voluntary efforts 
of investigators and institutions to do the same.’ (My emphasis)
Accordingly, the only purported support that Mahomed et al. proffer 
for their proposed shift away from the current altruistic paradigm, in 
fact lends no support to such proposed shift. 
Profit-sharing as a species of  
benefit-sharing 
Should society’s changing sense of social justice ever demand that 
research participants can no longer be expected to contribute 
biological material altruistically to commercial medical research, but 
are morally entitled to some benefit (beyond reimbursement for costs 
incurred), such benefit could take various forms, such as immediate 
payment, free products or healthcare services provided by the 
research organisation or its affiliates, or community-based benefits, 
such as building a new clinic or school. Mahomed et al. frame the 
benefit that they propose exclusively in monetary language and make 
it dependent on the eventual success of both the research and the 
commercialisation effort. (Mahomed et al. refer to the ‘distribution’ 
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and ‘apportionment’ of ‘proceeds’ and ‘profit’.[3,pp18-19]) The question 
should be posed as to whether this is the most appropriate form of 
benefit-sharing with research participants. Mahomed et al. do not 
provide a rationale for preferring their particular form of profit-
sharing over other forms of benefit-sharing. Should our country’s 
healthcare public policy ever move away from altruism and embrace 
benefit-sharing with research participants, there is a variety of 
benefit-sharing options available, and the proponent of one (or a 
certain combination) would have to put forward convincing reasons 
for favouring a specific one (or a specific combination) of benefit-
sharing options above the rest. 
Conclusion
Truog et al. – on whom Mahomed et al. purportedly rely – are 
clearly of the opinion that although not without its practical 
challenges, social justice can in principle be served within 
the altruistic paradigm. If Truog et al. are wrong, and social 
justice demands a new paradigm of benefit-sharing by research 
participants, the following ramifications must be considered: If 
research participants are entitled to benefit directly from their 
contribution of human biological material, why not also organ 
donors and blood donors? Is there a moral difference between 
having a blood sample taken for purposes of medical research, and 
having blood taken for purposes of blood transfusion; and if the 
answer is affirmative, does such moral difference warrant the right 
to a benefit in the former case but not the latter? These are just 
some of the ramifications that require consideration if one intends 
to mount a challenge to the current altruistic paradigm. In the 
absence of an exhaustive and convincing rationale for replacing 
the existing altruistic paradigm with a paradigm of benefit-
sharing by research participants, any discussion of benefits for 
research participants is driftwood in the legal-ethical ocean. 
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